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Case No. 20081068-SC
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN TRIPP,
Defendant/ Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals from its opinion in State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 197 P.3d 99
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the court of appeals impose a burden of proof greater than
required by the Fourth Amendment by requiring the State to produce "clear and
positive" testimony that the consent was " unequivocal" and freely given?
2. Did the court of appeals err in its assessment of probable cause when
considering whether the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent
circumstances exception?

3. Did the court of appeals impose a burden of proof for demonstrating
inevitable discovery that is greater than that required under State v. Topanotes,
2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159?
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision
of the court of appeals for correctness, which "turns on whether that court
accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 9,22 P.3d 1242. A trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, including its application of the
law to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15,103 P.3d 699. The trial court's
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004
UT 94, \ 11,100 P.3d 1222.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 23, 2004, the defendant, Susan Tripp, was involved in an
automobile-motorcycle accident that resulted in the death of the motorcyclist.
R. 3-4. Tripp was charged with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, and
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failure to yield the right of way, a class C misdemeanor. R. 2-4. Tripp moved to
suppress the evidence from a blood draw taken at the scene of the accident,
arguing that her consent was involuntary and that the blood draw was not
justified under the exigent circumstances exception. R. 36-58. The trial court
denied Tripp's motion. R. 60-62, 65-146,157-63 (Addendum B). After a fourday trial, a jury found Tripp guilty of both counts as charged. R. 248-57, 299.
The trial court sentenced Tripp to a prison term of zero-to-five years and a
concurrent jail term of 90 days, but suspended the sentence and placed Tripp on
supervised probation for 36 months. R. 397-400. As part of probation, the court
ordered Tripp to serve 360 days in jail with no early release, complete 200 hours
of community service, receive substance abuse treatment, and pay full and
complete restitution. R. 397-400, 452-53. Tripp appealed and the court of
appeals reversed. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388. The court held that Tripp's consent
was not voluntary, ^

14-17, that the blood draw was not justified under the

exigent circumstances exception, ^ 18-22, and that the blood alcohol evidence
would not have inevitably been discovered, ^ 23-25.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
About ten minutes before 7:00 p.m. on April 23,2004, Tripp was driving
eastbound on the Old Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County. R. 533:57; Tripp,
2008 UT App 388, ^f 3. After stopping for a stop sign at the U - l l l intersection,
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Tripp pulled out and collided with Daniel Pracht, a motorcyclist who was
traveling southbound on U-111. R. 533: 4, 9-10, 57. A Life Flight helicopter
transported Pracht to University Medical Center, but he died of his injuries the
following day. R. 533: 9; Obituary, Deseret News, April 28, 2004.
***

When Officer Doug Saunders arrived at the accident scene a few minutes
after 7:00 p.m., Tripp was sitting in another car with her husband, who had
arrived earlier. R. 533: 11, 16, 40-41, 49, 51, 64, 76, 85. Her son and others
arrived shortly after. R. 533: 48, 76. Tripp was crying and visibly shaken. R.
533: 43, 48, 52. She was also smoking a cigarette and, at the insistence of her
husband, drinking from a large bottle of water that was brought to her. R. 533:
47-48, 53-54, 56, 65, 70, 77r, 85-86, 89.

Tripp told Officer Saunders that she had stopped at the stop sign, but did
not see the motorcycle until after the collision. R. 533:57. Saunders asked Tripp
whether she had consumed any alcohol or was on any prescription medications.
R. 533:43-44,46,51-53. Tripp denied any such use. R. 533:44,52. Although he
did not smell the odor of alcohol or observe other indicia of impairment,
Saunders asked for Tripp's consent to do a blood draw. R. 533: 44, 46-47, 52.
Tripp responded that "she didn't like needles and did not want to take the test/ 7
but offered to submit to a urinalysis instead. R. 533: 44-47, 53-54.
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Cecelia Budd, a victim advocate for West Jordan City, arrived at
approximately 7:30 p.m. and remained with Tripp tliroughout the accident
investigation. R. 533: 75-77,82-83. When she first poked her head into the car to
see how Tripp was doing, Budd smelled the odor of alcohol, but could not tell
whether it was coming from Tripp. R. 533: 76, 83.
Just after 8:00 p.m., automobile homicide investigator Daniel Roberts
arrived at the scene. R. 533: 7-9. After being briefed on the situation, Roberts
also asked Tripp for consent, but she again refused because of her fear of
needles. R. 533:10-13,45-46,54-56,65,70. Roberts explained the seriousness of
the situation, his belief they could work around her fear, and the blood
technician's skill in conducting relatively quick and painless draws. R. 533:1116, 64. Tripp said she would give blood only if they "didn't use a needle to get
it," but both conceded to knowing of no other way. R. 533:12-13.
Roberts left Tripp with advocate Budd to see if she could get her to
"become more relaxed to the idea of having a blood draw." R. 533: 14-15.
Roberts returned to visit with Tripp twice more, "trying to convince her to
overcome her fear of the needles." R. 533:15,17. But "the more [he and others]
tried to convince her, the more defiant she [and her family] became." R. 533:17.
When Detective Roberts first observed Tripp, he noticed that her eyes
were red and that she was shaking and nervous. R. 533:11. Initially, Roberts
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assumed that Tripp's condition was the result of ctying. R. 533:11. However,
the longer he visited with Tripp, the more suspicious he became that she was
impaired. R. 533: 14. As he spoke with Tripp over the next 45 minutes to an
hour, Roberts noted that the redness did not dissipate as he would expect if it
had been caused from crying. R. 533:14,36-37. Although the tears in her eyes
cleared up, the redness remained. R. 533: 36. He also noted that Tripp was
smoking continually and seemed unconcerned about the victim. R. 533:14.
After his third attempt to obtain consent failed, and in the face of
increasingly hostile family members, Detective Roberts informed Tripp that he
would obtain a warrant for a blood draw and placed her in the backseat of his
patrol car. R. 533:16-18, 71-74, 78,100. Advocate Budd joined Tripp Inside the
patrol car, but Tripp's family and friends were not permitted to remain with her.
R. 533: 71-72, 78, 88. While in the patrol car, Budd smelled the odor of alcohol
emanating from Tripp's person. R. 533: 78-79,86-87. She also noticed that Tripp
slurred her words. R. 533: 84. Budd reported to officers at the scene that she
smelled the alcohol. R. 533: 84.
Brian Davis, the blood technician, arrived at the scene soon after Tripp
was placed in the patrol car. R. 533: 18, 91. Detective Roberts explained to
Davis that Tripp had refused to submit to a blood draw, that "it looked like it
was going to take ... a couple of hours to get the warrant," and that he would
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"call him back once [he] obtained the warrant." R. 533:18,99-100. When Davis
learned that Tripp's reluctance stemmed from her fear of needles, he responded,
"[I]f that's all it is, let me talk to her. I'm pretty good at getting them to work
around their fear of needles." R. 533:18, 91-92.
When Davis approached Tripp about a blood draw, she was very upset
and told him that she was terrified of needles. R. 533: 79-80, 87, 93-94. She
explained that she would not even allow her doctor to draw her blood. R. 533:
93. Davis tried to reassure her that he was very good and that it was really not
that hard. R. 533: 93. But Tripp "insisted] that she was very afraid of needles,
[and] that she wanted her husband to come over and reassure her through this
process." R. 533: 93. Davis explained that Tripp had the right to refuse a blood
draw, the right to counsel, and the right to remain silent. R. 533: 93,102. After
speaking with Tripp, Davis believed he "could probably get around [her] fear of
needles." R. 533:93,102. Davis returned to Officer Roberts and told him that he
believed "we can probably go ahead and do this. We've got her reassured and
talked into this . . . . " R. 533: 94; R. 533: 66.
When Davis returned to the car to do the blood draw, a plain clothes
officer accompanied him to witness the procedure. R. 533: 66-67, 72, 94, 96.
Davis said to Tripp, "You know, just let me put the tourniquet on your arm, see
if we can find a spot that would be easy to do this." R. 533: 94-95. Although she
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was still terrified, Tripp "very comfortably at that point let [Davis] try that." R.
533: 95. She "stuck her arm out for [Davis]" and said, "Okay, we'll go ahead
and do that." R. 533: 67, 71, 80-81, 87, 95. Davis did not believe Tripp knew at
that time that he had all of his other equipment ready. R. 533: 95. Davis rolled
up her sleeve and applied the tourniquet. R. 533: 95. He then told her that it
was an easy site and they could "go ahead and [take] care of [it]." R. 533: 95.
Although the plain clothes officer described Tripp's body language as
"pulling away," he testified that she did not pull her arm away, nor did she
object in any way. R. 533: 67,95,97. Kneeling in front of Tripp, advocate Budd
held Tripp's other hand and tried to calm her as Davis prepared to make the
blood draw. R. 533: 80. She told Tripp that she had seen Davis do blood draws
before, that he was good and fast, and assured her that he would be very gentle.
R. 533: 88. She then told Tripp to look at her, not at the needle, and take a deep
breath. R. 533: 80-81, 88, 95. Davis then drew a blood sample. R. 533: 95-97.
After the blood was drawn, Tripp immediately calmed, expressed surprise that
Davis had finished, and commented to advocate Budd that "it wasn' t as bad as
she thought" it would be. R. 533: 67-78, 81.
The toxicology report revealed that Tripp's blood-alcohol level was .08.
SE14.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Consent to search. The trial court found that officers successfully eased
Tripp's fear of needles and concluded that she voluntarily consented to the
blood draw. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State did not
produce " 'clear and positive testimony' that Tripp 'unequivocally] and freely'
consented to having her blood drawn." Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ^f 16 (citation
omitted). This Court should reverse.
The court of appeals applied the wrong burden of proof. The appropriate
burden of proof on a motion to suppress is the preponderance of the evidence
standard. The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard is a variation of the
more rigorous "clear and convincing" standard, designed to give effect to a
presumption against waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. The presumption
against waiver test was rejected by this court in State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37
P.3d 1073, and State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650.
When the appropriate standard is applied, the record supports the trial
court's determination that Tripp voluntarily consented to the blood draw.
II. Exigent circumstances. In any event, the court of appeals should have
affirmed on the alternative ground that the blood draw was justified under the
exigent circumstances exception. Under that exception, the State must not only
demonstrate an exigency that justifies a warrantless blood draw, it must also
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establish probable cause as traditionally required for any search for evidence.
The court of appeals concluded that probable cause did not exist and did not
therefore reach the exigency issue. It's assessment of probable cause was
erroneous.
In assessing probable cause, the court of appeals considered only those
facts that detracted from a probable cause finding. It failed to consider those
factors supporting probable cause. The court of appeals did not consider
Detective Roberts' testimony that he became suspicious Tripp was impaired
because (1) the redness in her eyes was not dissipating as he would expect if it
had been caused by crying; (2) she was continually smoking, and (3) she
exhibited no concern for the victim.

The court failed to consider the

circumstances of the accident, i.e., Tripp inexplicably pulled in front of the
motorcyclist, despite an unobstructed view. And most significantly, the court
did not consider testimony from both the victim advocate and blood technician
that they could smell the odor of alcohol from Tripp's person. The court's
failure to consider "all the circumstances" resulted in an erroneous probable
cause determination.
Although the court of appeals did not address the exigency requirement,
this Court should do so, rather than remand to the court of appeals. The
evidence demonstrated that the officers had been investigating the accident for
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approximately one hour and that it would have taken additional time to secure
a warrant. In light of these facts, together with the evanescent nature of bloodalcohol evidence and the severity of the accident, the exigencies of the situation
were sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw.
III. Inevitable discovery. Finally, contrary to the opinion of the court of
appeals, the State established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that bloodalcohol evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means.

That Detective Roberts would have pursued a warrant was not

"speculative/ 7 as held by the court of appeals. Roberts testified that when he
failed to obtain Tripp's consent, he placed her in custody and told her he would
pursue a warrant. He testified, and told the blood technician, that it would take
a couple of hours. He explained at trial that he was going to gather information
from others at the scene, prepare the affidavit, review it with a prosecutor, and
secure authorization from a judge. The only reason he did not pursue this
course was that the blood technician obtained consent before he could complete
the process.
As discussed above, the facts and circumstances confronting the officers at
the scene established probable cause that Tripp was intoxicated, justifying
issuance of the warrant. Although the blood-alcohol evidence would have
undoubtedly dissipated, some evidence of alcohol use would likely remain.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATE DEMONSTRATED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY
CONSENTED TO THE BLOOD DRAW
The district court denied Susan Tripp's challenge to the blood draw taken
after the accident, concluding that she 'Voluntarily consented7' to it. R. 160. The
court recognized that Tripp initially refused to submit to the blood draw "based
. . . on her fear of needles," but found "that at the time of the blood draw [her]
fear was resolved." R. 160. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
prosecution "failed to meet its b u r d e n . . . to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily
gave consent." Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, at <[ 26. This Court should reverse
because the court of appeals imposed a stricter burden of proof upon the State
than is required under the Fourth Amendment.
A. A warrantless search is reasonable under th e Fourth Amendm ent
if the State establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the search was conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent.
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of
both a wrarrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). To be valid, a
consent to search must be " 'freely and voluntarily given/ " i.e., the co rtsent may
"not be coerced, by explicit or implied means, by implied threat or co\ ert force."
Id. at 222, 228 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). In

short, a consent must be " 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker/ " Id. at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961)). If it is, the consent is valid and the fruits of the search are admitted.
If it is not, the consent is invalid and the fruits of the search are suppressed.
When relying upon the consent exception to justify a search, the
prosecution " 'has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given/" Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (1968)). As
explained by this Court in State v. Hansen, "[t]he appropriate standard to
determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances, and the burden of
proof is by [a] preponderance of the evidence." 2002 UT125, ^ 56, 63 P.3d 650.
Under the totality of the circumstances test, "a court should carefully scrutinize
both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." Id.
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225).
B.

The court of appeals applied a stricter standard for proving
voluntariness than is required under the Fourth Amendment.
In its opinion below, the court of appeals correctly held that "[t]he State

. .. has the burden of establishing that consent was [voluntarily] given," based
on the totality of the circumstances. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, at f 14. But rather
than reviewing the State's evidence under the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the court of appeals "look[ed] to see if [the State produced] clear and
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given/" Id.
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(quoting State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 293 (Utah App. 1998)). The court
concluded that "[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that
there is 'clear and positive testimony' that Tripp "unequivocally] and freely'
consented to having her blood drawn." Id. at ^f 16 (quoting Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at
293). The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard of proof used by the court
of appeals imposes a burden that is not required under the Fourth Amendment.
The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard has its roots in the threepart Ham test once used by the court of appeals for determining whether a
consent was voluntarily given:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was given without duress
or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first
two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,439 (Utah App. 1996) (brackets in original) (citations
omitted).

This Court, however, rejected the Ham test, in part, because

"voluntariness must be determined, not from a demonstration of waiver, but
from 'the totality of all the circumstances.'" State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 45,37
P.3d 1073 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The Court instead adheres to
the straightforward analysis of Schneckloth: the State "must show consent was
given without duress or coercion."

Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 57.
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"[T]he

appropriate standard... is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden
of proof is by [a] preponderance of the evidence." Id. at^f 56.
The underlying rationale for the presumption against waiver was that
because a finding of consent "nullifies a constitutional right," it "should be
approached with caution, and with full cognizance of... the unlikelihood of the
waiver of a basic personal right." Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680,684 (10th
Cir. 1962), abrogated by United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991).] The
"clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard of proof gave effect to that
presumption by requiring that the consent be "unequivocal," that the evidence
be "convincing," and that the testimony be "clear and positive." Villano, 310
F.2d at 684. Simply put, it is a variation of the "clear and convincing" standard,
which "is typically employed . . . where a particular claim is disfavored on
policy grounds." A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Cliaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d
1020,1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But as explained in Schneckloth, "'it is no part of the
policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage
citizens from [consenting to searches]/" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, Ham's "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard
should be discarded along with the presumption against waiver.

1

The Ham test was taken from Villano. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, f 44.

-15-

It has been argued that a stricter standard of proof is required to
adequately protect the constitutional values the exclusionary rule is designed to
serve. See Lego v. Twoniey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972). The Supreme Court has
rejected this argument. Id. The exclusionary rule is a harsh remedy, keeping
from the jury evidence of guilt" 'for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the
reliability of verdicts/" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,168 (1986). As a result,
application of the rule often results in "letting guilty and possibly dangerous
defendants go free — something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal
justice system/" Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (citation
omitted). In light of these substantial costs, the Supreme Court has concluded
that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should [be] no
greater . . . than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,178 (1974); accord Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1f 56. "[A]dded
burdens on the already difficult task of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
[should not be imposed] by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of
unquestioned truth before juries." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 n.5 (1984).
C. The State demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw.
Applying the proper preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial
court's ruling should be affirmed. The court of appeals suggested that Davis
obtained Defendant's consent through trickery. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ^j
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17 (stating that Davis "immediately dr[e]w her blood" after making the
"ambiguous comment" that "we can go ahead and [take] care of this"). The
evidence, however, supported the trial court's finding, R. 159: f 15, that "[w]hen
asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the defendant
voluntarily extended her arm."

See R. 533: 67, 71, 80-81, 87-88, 94-95

(demonstrating that Davis told Defendant he found an easy site and that they
could go ahead and do it and that Budd told Defendant to not look at the needle
and take a deep breath). The court of appeals suggested that Defendant tried to
pull her arm away to prevent a blood draw. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ^f 17.
Again, this interpretation is contrary to the trial court's express finding that
Defendant "never tried to withdraw her arm and she never said 'no' or 'stop,'"
R. 159, f 16, and the evidence which amply supports that finding. R. 533:67,80,
95 (demonstrating that the pulling away was in the form of body language only
and that Defendant never attempted to withdraw her arm).
The court of appeals also suggests that Defendant's consent was in
response to a threat by Officer Roberts that he would secure a warrant if she did
not consent. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, If 17. But the evidence demonstrates that
the officer's indication that he was going to obtain a warrant was not a means
used to obtain her consent. See R. 533:16-17,73,78. Additionally, and as found
by the trial court, Davis "reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent,
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her right to counsel, and her right to refuse consent" — a fact the court of appeals
fails to consider.

See R. 159: f 14; R. 533: 93, 102. This Court in Hansen

specifically recognized that "'officer[s] who include[ ] such a warning in [their]
request for consent undoubtedly present[ ] a stronger case for a fHiding of
voluntariness/ ,/ Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 59 n.6 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 52 n.12 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
In sum, when the appropriate standard is applied, the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the trial court's determination that Defendant voluntarily
consented to the blood draw. This Court should reverse the court o f appeals'
holding to the contrary.
II.
THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW WAS SUPPORTED BY
PROBABLE CAUSE AND JUSTIFIED BY THE EXIGENCIES OF
THE SITUATION
On direct appeal, the State argued that the court of appeals could also
affirm the trial court's ruling on the alternative ground of exigent circumstances.
See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ^f 18. The court of appeals rejected the State's
alternative argument, holding that police did not have probable cause to believe
that Tripp was impaired. Id. at ^f 22. This Court should reverse because the
court of appeals failed to take account of facts which supported a finding of
probable cause.
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A. A warrantless search for evidence under the exigent
circumstances exception requires a threshold showing of
probable cause.
"One class of exceptions to the warrant requirement is exigent
circumstances/' State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^f 16,156 P.3d 771. Under this
exception, a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when
"'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393-94 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451,456 (1948)). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court recognized that dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream may
create an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw under the exigent
circumstances exception. Accord Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15.
Just as a search for evidence under a warrant requires probable cause, so
too does a search for evidence under the exigent circumstances exception. See
Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (holding that "police officers need . . .
probable cause plus exigent circumstances" to conduct a warrantless search), hi
discussing this threshold showing in the context of a warrantless blood draw,
the Supreme Court in Schmerber held that police must have "a clear indication
that in fact... evidence [of intoxication] will be found." 384 U.S. at 769-70. This
Court has held that Schmerber's "clear indication" requirement "impose[s] a
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heightened standard for determining probable cause that evidence will be found
in the context of searches involving bodily intrusions/' State v. Alverez, 2006 UT
61, f 27,147 P.3d 425; accord Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^ 25 (holding that Schmerber
"impose[d] a more rigorous standard for probable cause"). The Court misreads
Schmerber.
The question in Schmerber was "whether the police were justified in
requiring [Schmerber] to submit to [a] blood test/r following a serious injury
accident that resulted in Schmerber's arrest for driving under the influence.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69. The Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether the blood draw was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception, which gives police "an unrestricted 'right/" without independent
justification, "' to search the person of the accused [for weapons and evidence]
when legally arrested/" Id. at 769 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
392 (1914)). The Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest exception
does not extend "to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface."
Id. at 769. The Court held that to justify those searches, there must be a "clear
indication" that evidence of intoxication will be found. Id.
As noted by this Court, Schmerber "did not clearly explain what it meant
by 'clear indication/ " Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 27. However, the Supreme Court's
ensuing discussion in Schmerber makes plain that it intended no different
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standard than the traditional probable cause standard used in all other cases
involving a search for evidence. As discussed, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that a blood draw falls within the purview of a search incident to arrest,
requiring instead a "clear indication" that the desired evidence will be found.
Then, turning to this threshold requirement, the Supreme Court observed that
"the facts which established probable cause to arrest in this case also suggested tlie
... likely success of a test of [Schmerber's] blood for alcohol!' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770 (emphasis added). The Court then turned to the question of whether the
officer was required to secure a warrant or permitted to proceed without one.
Id. The Court concluded that "[sjearch warrants are ordinarily required for
searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less [can] be required where
intrusions into the human body are concerned." Id.
As noted by Justice Marshall in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
the foregoing language in Schmerber "strongly suggests] that the 'clear
indication' needed to justify a compulsory blood test amounted to a showing of
probable cause." 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).2

The

majority in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985), likewise concluded that in

2

Justice Marshall cited United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
540 (1985), as a case suggesting that the "clear indication" standard is
commensurate with the reasonable suspicion standard. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at
644. Justice Marshall did not hold that view, and neither does the State.
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requiring a "clear indication" of intoxication, Schmerber intended to do no more
than impose the standard probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment: "Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of the Fourth
Amendment would be the threshold requirements for conducting [a] search and
seizure [into the body]. We noted the importance of probable cause/' (emphases
added).

This Court should likewise recognize that the "clear indication"

language imposes the time-honored probable cause standard used in all other
cases involving a search for evidence.
B.

The warrantless blood draw was supported by probable cause.
Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, see Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, % <([

18-22, the facts and circumstances available to the officers at the time of the
blood draw provided probable cause to believe evidence of intoxication would
be found in a blood test.
Probable cause "is a 'practical, nontechnical conception'" that "deal[s]
with probabilities," not certainties. Id. at 231 (citation omitted). Although
probable cause requires "more than mere suspicion," Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^f
24, it "does not require more than a rationally based conclusion of probability."
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). Simply put, probable cause
involves "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462
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U.S. 213,231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175 (1949)).
As explained in Gates, "practical people formulate[ ] certain common-sense
conclusions about human behavior; [law enforcement officers] are permitted to
do the same/ 7 Id. at 231-32.
In determining whether probable cause exists, "the task of the [court] is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances.. ., there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime [would] be found in a particular place/' Id. at 238. Like reasonable
suspicion, "[t]he determination of whether probable cause exists . . . depends
upon an examination of all the information available to the searching officer in
light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search wras made/'
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. Moreover, "[t]he validity of the probable cause
determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable,
cautious police officer... guided by his experience and training/" Id. (quoting
United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
In this case, the court of appeals reviewed only those facts that detracted
from a probable cause finding. It did not consider those facts which supported a
probable cause finding. That is error. As discussed, courts must consider "all
the circumstances" when determining the existence of probable cause. Gates,
462 U.S. at 238. When all the facts and circumstances are considered in this case,

the record demonstrates that there was probable cause to believe that evidence
of intoxication would be found in a blood test.
It is true that Officers Saunders and Monson did not notice the odor of
alcohol on Tripp's breath or observe other indicia of impairment. See R. 533:4346, 51-53, 65, 69-70. However, these officers' interactions with Tripp were
minimal.

Although Officer Saunders, as the initial officer on the scene,

questioned Tripp about the accident, he spoke with her only "briefly." R. 533:
42,50. He stood within three feet of Tripp during the conversation, but she was
sitting in a vehicle. R. 533:42-43. She was also smoking and "there was a heavy
odor of smoke" about her. R. 533: 48. When Officer Monson arrived about an
hour later, Tripp was still sitting in the car and people were still smoking. R.
533: 64-65.3 Moreover, Monson was only minimally involved in the attempts to
obtain Tripp's consent. R. 533: 65. And although he witnessed the blood draw,
Tripp was sitting in the patrol vehicle and Monson was outside behind the open
door. R. 533:96.
Detective Roberts also arrived on the scene about an hour after the
accident. R. 533:22. His conversations with Tripp were more extensive. When
he first spoke with Tripp, Roberts did not observe any obvious signs of
impairment. See R. 158: ^f 7. Tripp was shaking and nervous, and her eyes were
3

Officer Monson did not recall who was smoking. R. 533: 65.
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red, but there were no tears. R. 533:11. Roberts "assumed that the redness in
[Tripp's] eyes was from crying/ 7 R. 533: 11. However, as found by the trial
court, "[t]he more [Roberts] spoke with [Tripp], the more concerned he became
that she was impaired by something/' R. 158: ^f 5; accord R. 533:14. He believed
that Tripp "was impaired with some kind of alcohol or chemical" because (1) the
"redness in her eyes was not dissipating" as he would expect if it had been
caused by crying; (2) "she was continually smoking," and (3) she exhibited no
concern for the victim. R. 533: 14, 36. These facts, and Detective Roberts'
assessment of them, were ignored by the court of appeals.
Although the red eyes meant little to Roberts when he first arrived, they
became significant when her eyes cleared from the tears but remained red.
Moreover, the continual smoking explains the inability of the officers to smell
the odor of alcohol and it is widely recognized that smoking is frequently used
to mask, or attempt to mask, the odor of alcohol. See, e.g., United States v. Moore,
329 F.3d 399, 401 n.l (5th Cir. 2003) (officer testifying that "an individual may
light a cigar or cigarette during a traffic stop to mask the odor of alcohol or
drugs"); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.) (officer testifying
that "lighting a cigarette is usually done to mask an incriminating odor"), cert,
denied, 528 U.S. 981 (1999); United States v. Hindhaugh, 166 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.
1999) (unpublished opinion) (recognizing that "a freshly lit cigarette... is often
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used to mask drug or alcohol odors"); State v. Feldbrugge, 50 P.3d 1067, 1068
(Mont. 2002) (officer testifying that he could smell odor of alcohol after driver
was asked to extinguish cigarette).
Tripp's apparent lack of concern for the motorcyclist also added to the
probable cause analysis. Common sense would suggest that an unhurt driver in
a serious accident would exhibit significant concern for any victims suffering
serious injury.

Where such a driver does not exhibit that concern, it is

reasonable to infer that the driver is instead preoccupied with the possibility
police may discover evidence of guilt for driving under the influence. This is by
no means a determinative factor, but certainly adds to the equation when
considered in light of other factors.
The court of appeals ignored another significant factor supporting a
probable cause finding: Tripp pulled into the intersection in front of the
motorcyclist, despite an unobstructed view. See R. 533: 42-43, 57, 59. When
considered in light of the other factors, such carelessness suggests that her
failure to recognize the danger was due to impairment.
The court of appeals, however, also ignored the factor that carried the
greatest weight in the probable cause equation—the trial court's factual finding
that "[t]he victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in the family car" and that Brian
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Davis, the blood technician, also "detected] an odor of alcohol from the
defendant" when he spoke to her about a blood draw. R. 158: Tf Tf 8,13; accord R.
533:76-79,83,86-87. The court of appeals also failed to take into account Budd's
testimony that Defendant slurred her words while speaking with her. R. 533:84.
These indicia of impairment, standing alone, were more than sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. The court of appeals7 holding that probable
cause did not exist should thus be reversed.
C. Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw.
Because the court of appeals found no probable cause, it did not address
the question of whether an exigency justified the warrantless blood draw.
Although the Court may remand the case to the court of appeals to address that
issue, the more judicially efficient course would be to decide the matter itself.
The warrantless blood draw was justified by the exigencies of the situation.
"Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless blood draw
"depends on 'all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself/" Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, *[[ 51 (quoting
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537). Relevant factors include the time it
would take to obtain a warrant, the availability of a telephonic warrant, and the
ongoing nature of the investigation. See id. at ^

11, 54. In this case, Officer

Roberts testified that it would take "a couple of hours" to obtain a warrant
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because he would "have to review all the information with the officers at the
scene,... call another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and go
with [him] to review the warrant with the district attorney and then have it
signed by a district court judge/' R. 533:18-19. Moreover, the accident occurred
just before 7:00 p.m. on a Friday evening, see R. 533:5, when the courts would be
closed.
Most significantly, as in Rodriguez, "[o]ne fact dominates all others with
respect to its relevance to whether the warrantless blood draw was reasonable:
that [the victim] was expected to succumb to [his] injuries/' Rodriguez, 2007 UT
15, f 57. "This fact significantly alterfs] the warrant acquisition calculus that a
reasonable law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe an
alcohol-related offense has occurred could be expected to apply." Id. The
seriousness of the accident, together with the strong evidence of defendant's
alcohol impairment, was "sufficient to establish that the interests of law
enforcement outweighed ... [defendant's] privacy interests," justifying a
warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception. Id. at ^ 60.
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III.
BLOOD ALCOHOL EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY
BEEN DISCOVERED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT
In reversing the trial court's order denying Tripp's motion to suppress,
the court of appeals also rejected the State's inevitable discovery claim. Tripp,
2008 UT App 388, ^ 1f 23-25. The court concluded that the State's argument that
it would inevitably have discovered the blood alcohol evidence [pursuant to a
warrant] is conjectural at best/7 Id. at f 24. In support of this conclusion, the
court held that "[t]he record does not indicate that a warrant would actually
have been issued in this case or that the desired blood test results would
actually have been obtained thereby/ 7 Id. The court deemed as insufficient
evidence that Detective Roberts would pursue a warrant but for the consent
obtained through Brian Davis. Id. at ^f 25. The court of appeals, however,
misapprehended the burden imposed under State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76
P.3d 1159, and it again ignored evidence probative of the issue.
"The inevitable discovery doctrine . . . enables courts to look to the facts
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police
would have discovered the evidence despite the illegality/' Id. Topanotes
explained that "'[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis
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that the evidence should be received/" Id. at ^f 14 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
The court of appeals required a level of certainty that is not consistent with the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
The court of appeals asserts that" [gjiven the investigating officers' singleminded focus on getting [Tripp] to consent to have her blood drawn, amassing
facts to establish probable cause was simply not their objective." Tripp, 2008 UT
App 388, ^ 22 n.9. While the focus of the officers during the first hour was
undoubtedly to persuade Tripp to consent to a blood draw, the evidence is
undisputed that Officer Roberts abandoned that focus, placed Tripp in a patrol
car, and told her that he was going to obtain a warrant. R. 533: 16-17. Any
doubt regarding his sincerity was eliminated when he tried to send Davis away
upon his arrival at the scene shortly thereafter. Detective Roberts "apologized
that he'd arrived/' told Davis that "it looked like it was going to take [him] a
couple of hours to get the warrant/' and "offered to call him back once he
obtained the warrant/ 7 R. 533: 18. Had Detective Roberts only been bluffing
about the warrant to Tripp, he would have no recison to send Davis away.
Detective Roberts' testimony also established the steps he was prepared to
take had Tripp not consented to the blood draw. When asked why he thought it
would take a couple of hours to secure a warrant, Detective Roberts testified
that he "ha[d] to review all the information with the officers at the scene,. . . call
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another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and . . . review the
warrant with the district attorney [,] and then have it signed by a district court
judge/' R. 533:18-19.
The foregoing evidence was more than sufficient to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Detective Roberts would have taken the
necessary steps to secure a warrant had Tripp not consented to the blood draw.
This case is not unlike Nix, where the Supreme Court endorsed the
inevitable discovery doctrine.

In Nix, Robert Williams was arrested in

connection with the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435.
Police initiated a large-scale grid-search for the girl, but it was called off after
Williams led police to her body. Id. at 435-36. Williams moved to suppress
evidence of the body because his statements to police, which led them to the
girl's body, were taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id.
at 437. The Supreme Court held that under the inevitable discovery doctrine,
the evidence should not be suppressed. Id. at 440-50. Based on the record, the
Court was "satisfied . .. that the volunteer search teams would have resumed
the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the body and the body
inevitably would have been found." Id. at 449-50.
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Similar to the situation in Nix, Detective Roberts "would have resumed"
his pursuit of a warrant had Tripp "not earlier" consented to the blood draw
and the blood-alcohol evidence "inevitably would have been found." Id.
The court of appeals also questioned whether there was probable cause to
support a warrant. However, as discussed in point II above, the facts available
to the officers at the time were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
The State concedes that blood-alcohol evidence would have dissipated by the
time Detective Roberts secured a warrant. However, at least some blood-alcohol
evidence was likely to remain.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the appeal to the court
of appeals for disposition of the second issue on direct appeal.
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ORME, Judge:
fl
Alleging error in the denial of her pretrial motion to
suppress evidence, Susan Tripp appeals from her jury conviction
of automobile homicide. We conclude that the appeal is welltaken, reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress
evidence, and remand for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
%2
"The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly
fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 2, 103 P.3d 699.
We therefore recite the facts in some detail.
1J3
On April 23, 2004, Tripp was driving eastbound on the Old
Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County, Utah. She stopped at the
stop sign at the U-111 intersection and, after stopping, pulled
out and collided with a motorcyclist traveling southbound on

U-lll.1 The motorcyclist died soon after from injuries sustained
in the crash.
^4
Police and emergency personnel immediately arrived on the
scene, including West Jordan Police Officer Saunders, who asked
Tripp if he could obtain a blood sample from her. Although
Officer Saunders testified at trial that he did not observe any
signs indicating that Tripp was impaired and that he did not have
any reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of any
substance, he testified that he seeks blood draws in serious
accidents as a matter of course. And the trial court, in its
findings, indicated that " [n]o officer detected the odor of
alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs
of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech." Tripp
denied consuming alcohol or prescription drugs when asked by
Officer Saunders.
f5
Tripp told Officer Saunders that she did not want to submit
to a blood test because she did not like needles but tha'i she was
willing to consent to a urinalysis. Officer Saunders then
conferred with an automobile homicide investigator, Detective
Roberts, informing him that Tripp was unwilling to submit to a
blood draw because she was scared of needles. After some
discussion, the two officers determined that a blood sample was
necessary and decided to renew the effort to obtain Tripp's
consent for a blood draw.2
%6
Detective Roberts then approached Tripp and again asked for
her consent to a blood draw, which she refused to provide--again
citing her fear of needles. She renewed the offer to furnish a
urine sample and, indeed, a blood sample--provided a needle was
not used to obtain it. Detective Roberts told Tripp that he did
not know of any other way to obtain blood and suggested that her
fear of needles was something that could be worked around.
Detective Roberts explained that the department's blood
1. Trial testimony by experts put the motorcyclist's speed just
prior to impact at about sixty miles per hour, the posted speed
limit.
2. The record is devoid of any indication that a Breathalyzer or
Intoxilyzer test was considered--a rather curious fact given that
Tripp was not generally uncooperative and stood ready to provide
a urine sample or even a blood sample, provided a needle was not
used. One might surmise that a suspect ready to provide a
roadside urine sample would readily provide a breath sample
instead, if given that choice. Nor did Officer Saunders or
Detective Roberts at any time request that Tripp undergo any
alternative tests, such as field sobriety tests.
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technician was highly skilled and would be able to do the draw
quickly and relatively painlessly. During this exchange,
Detective Roberts observed that Tripp appeared nervous, was
shaking, and had red eyes without any tears. Detective Roberts
testified that he began to believe that Tripp was impaired, based
on her apparent lack of concern for the victim, her continual
smoking, and the fact that the redness in her eyes was not
dissipating. He also acknowledged that it was normal for an
individual involved in a serious accident to be shaky and
nervous.
f7
Because Detective Roberts's further attempts to obtain
Tripp's consent were unsuccessful, he approached the department's
victims' rights advocates, whose presence is often requested at
the scene of serious accidents, for assistance, to see "if they
could calm [Tripp] down and . . . have her become more relaxed to
the idea of having a blood draw." In the presence of Tripp's
family--who had arrived at the scene a few minutes after the
accident--and the advocates, Detective Roberts again asked Tripp
to submit to a blood draw, and Tripp "adamantly refused to
submit." Based on this refusal and protestations from Tripp's
family at his repeated requests for a blood draw, Detective
Roberts took Tripp into custody,3 removing her from her vehicle
and placing her in the back of a police vehicle. Detective
Roberts told Tripp that she was now in custody and that he was
going to obtain a warrant and force the blood draw. Detective
Roberts, however, never tried to secure the warrant because the
blood technician, Brian Davis, arrived on the scene immediately
after this exchange.
f8
Detective Roberts explained the situation to Davis--that
Tripp would not consent, that it was going to take several hours
to obtain a warrant, and that he would call Davis back once the
warrant had been obtained. Upon learning that Tripp refused
consent only because of her fear of needles, Davis replied,
"[W]ell, if that's all it is, let me talk to her. I'm usually
pretty good at getting them to work around their fear of
needles." Davis then went to talk with Tripp in the back of
Officer Monson's patrol car.

3. Throughout the briefs, both parties seem to use the concepts
of "arrest" and "custody" interchangeably. Indeed, at the
suppression hearing, Detective Roberts testified both that he
took Tripp into "custody" and that he put her under arrest.
Because the parties consistently characterize Tripp's custody as
amounting to an arrest, we have no occasion to consider whether
her detention was only a "level two" investigative detention.
See generally State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 21, 164 P.3d 397.
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^9
Davis tried to reassure Tripp of the relative ease and
painlessness of the blood draw procedure. Tripp insisted that
she was afraid and that even her own doctor would not draw her
blood because of her fear. Davis testified that he thought he
would be able to obtain her consent based on his reassurances,
told this to Detective Roberts, and said, "I really think we can
probably go ahead and do this. We've got her reassured and
talked into this[.]M Davis then put a tourniquet on Tripp's arm
to see "if we can find a spot that would be easy to do this," to
which Tripp responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." Tripp
stuck her arm out for Davis to apply the tourniquet. Davis told
her that he found an easy site and that "we can go ahead and
[take] care of this." Davis testified that Tripp probabLy did
not know that he had his equipment ready and that he was prepared
to draw her blood and that he "just kind of stuck her with the
needle as quick as [he] could and got the blood done." "During
the draw, Tripp was in a police car with an officer outside the
door covering her eyes, a victims' rights advocate kneeling in
front of her holding one of her hands, and Davis outside the car
door holding her arm in such a way that she could not see it.
Cecilia Budd, the victims' rights advocate who was with her,
consistently reassured Tripp and told her that she had seen Davis
draw blood before and that he was very good. After the draw,
Tripp became calm and was surprised that the blood draw was done.
^10 Officer Monson, who witnessed the blood draw, testified that
"[Tripp] looked terrified. She had talked to us about her fear
of needles and she looked terrified." He also testified that she
was "pulling away. She was crying," but that she had "offered
her arm." Budd testified that, at times, Tripp was
uncontrollably crying. The blood draw showed a metabolite of
cocaine and a blood alcohol level just above the legal limit.
i[ll The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-207(2), see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (Supp. 2007), and with failure to
yield the right of way, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code section 41-6-72.10(3), see Utah Code Ann. § 41-672.10(3) (1998) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-902
(2005)). Tripp moved to suppress the blood test results. After
an evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. The
trial court found that Tripp voluntarily consented to the blood
draw, that her initial refusal was based "solely on her fear of
needles, and [that] the evidence demonstrates that at the time of
the blood draw the defendant's fear was resolved." Having been
convicted following a jury trial, Tripp now appeals.
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ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
fl2 Tripp argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to suppress. Specifically, Tripp challenges the trial
court's finding that she consented to the blood draw.4 "We
review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly
erroneous standard. However, we review the trial court's
conclusions of law based on these findings for correctness[.]"
State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we grant no
deference to the trial court in its application of the law to its
factual findings. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15, 103 P.3d
699.5
ANALYSIS
f13 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, including in situations where blood is drawn from a
suspect and then analyzed. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,
292 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass f n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)), cert, denied, 982
P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). "[S]earches conducted . . . without
[warrants] . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). Such exceptions include
searches based on valid consent, see State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d
684, 687 (Utah 1990), and searches based on probable cause where

4. It was suggested from the bench during oral argument before
this court that perhaps Tripp had consented to providing a blood
sample, just not to the method employed in extracting it, and
that given that her articulated concern was on that basis rather
than protections enshrined in the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, the
blood draw might constitute a battery but should not trigger
evidentiary suppression. That angle was not pursued by the
State, perhaps because of the reality that blood can only be
extracted by means of a needle, and we are aware of no authority
supporting the notion that it is conceptually possible to consent
to a blood draw while withholding consent to being pricked with a
needle.
5. Tripp also argues that the trial court erred in not allowing
the jurors to consider whether the motorcyclist's conduct was a
superseding cause of the accident. Given our disposition, we
need not address this issue.
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exigent circumstances obviate the need for a warrant, see State
v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 16, 156 P.3d 771.
I.

Consent

fl4 We start with consideration of whether Tripp consented
voluntarily to the blood draw. "[C]onsent which is not
voluntarily given is invalid." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973); Bredehoft,
966 P.2d at 292-93. The appropriate standard to determine
whether consent is voluntary "is the totality of the
circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 56r 63 P.3d
650. "Under the totality of the circumstances test, a court
should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention,
and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. (citing
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248). "Consent is not voluntary if it
is obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied.'" State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, <| 47, 37 P.3d 1073
(citation omitted). "'[W]e further look to see if there is clear
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and
freely given.'" Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted).
"In other words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may his
'capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired.'"
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 57 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). The State, of course, has the burden of establishing
that consent was validly given. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.
^15 "Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, and the
analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same without
regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police
conduct." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)
(citation omitted). Thus, if we determine that Tripp did not
voluntarily consent to having her blood drawn, we need not reach
the issue of "whether the consent was obtained by police
exploitation of [a] prior illegality." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688.
See also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. The State argues that Tripp
voluntarily consented to a warrantless blood draw in light of the
totality of the circumstances. We disagree.
1il6 Given the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that
there is "clear and positive testimony" that Tripp
"unequivocal[ly] and freely" consented to having her blood drawn.
See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). After
refusing to submit to a blood draw several times--to Officer
Saunders, to Detective Roberts, and to Brian Davis--Tripp was
informed that she was in custody, removed from the presence of
her family, and placed in a police car. Detective Roberts
testified that she was arrested because "the more [the officers]
tried to convince her, the more defiant she became . . . and we
were losing control of the situation." She was told that if she
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did not submit, a warrant would be obtained and she would be
forced to give a blood sample. A warrant was never sought,
however, because the blood technician, Brian Davis, told
Detective Roberts, "I really think we can probably go ahead and
do this." When Tripp extended her arm prior to the blood test,
to the extent the gesture was voluntary at all under the
circumstances, it was in response to Davis's telling her that he
was going to apply the tourniquet and see if he could find an
easy spot to draw blood. Davis even testified that he was not
sure that Tripp knew that he had his blood drawing equipment
ready and was prepared to draw her blood when she extended her
arm. Once he found an easy site to draw from, he told her "we
can go ahead and [take] care of this," and he proceeded to
immediately draw her blood without an express indication of her
consent and without first allowing her to reaffirm, yet again,
her refusal to consent.
fl7 The State contends that Tripp's failure to immediately
withdraw her arm must be taken as a clear indication of her
consent. We cannot agree. During the blood draw, Tripp was
surrounded by people working for the State--she was in a police
car with an officer outside the door covering her eyes, a
victims' advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her
hands, and the blood technician outside the car holding her arm
where she could not see it. All the while Tripp was, according
to the witnesses, terrified, crying, and panicked. Given the
context of the threat of a forced blood draw, her arrest by the
police, and the presence and participation of the State's many
actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that Tripp
voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn simply because she
failed to retract her arm in the instant between when Davis said
"we can go ahead and [take] care of this "--an ambiguous comment
as concerns the timing of the intended blood draw in any event-and when he inserted the needle. Indeed, Officer Monson, the
officer who witnessed the draw, testified that although Tripp
initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling away," and
"[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so [she] wouldn't
look at the needle." The State argues that this is a natural
response from someone who fears needles. We think, however, that
given the context of her continuous refusals to submit to a blood
draw, her expressed fear of needles, her arrest, the threat that
she would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant was
obtained,6 and her crying and pulling away during the blood draw,
6. Although in many cases such a "threat" would be neither
inaccurate nor coercive, see, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1207 (Utah 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), this is not such a case. Here, as
(continued...)
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the State has failed to meet its burden and to demonstrate that
Tripp voluntarily gave consent under the totality of the
circumstances.7 See generally Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.
II.

Exigent Circumstances

1[l8 The State next asks us to affirm Tripp's conviction because
Detective Roberts was justified in "forcing a blood draw under
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."
While this court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record," State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, fl 11, 173 P.3d 213
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we do not agree
that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement justified the warrantless blood draw in this case.8
fl9 A generally recognized exception to the warrant reqiirement
is the one referred to as "exigent circumstances." See State v.
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, % 16, 156 P.3d 771. But to justify a
warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, there must
still be probable cause. See State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT
App 65, % 9, 108 P.3d 123 ("[A] warrantless search . . . is
constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven.") (first alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Comer,
2002 UT App 219, \% 21, 24, 51 P.3d 55 (same), cert, denied, 59
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). In other words, the exigencies cf a
situation may excuse the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a
warrant be obtained, but not the requirement that a search be
premised on probable cause.

6. (...continued)
discussed in Part II, there was no demonstrated probable cause to
justify an involuntary blood draw.
7. This case stands in stark contrast to State v. Bredehoft, 966
P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 8£ (Utah
1999) , where we readily agreed with the State that a defendant
who offered his arm to a blood technician had consented to the
blood draw. See id. at 293. In that case, the defendant offered
no resistance, the defendant did not say "no" or object in any
way, and the defendant's blood was taken in a much less coercive
environment, i.e., the defendant was in the back of an ambulance
with only one officer present.
8. Neither, apparently, did the trial court, which premised its
decision entirely on consent.
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^20 Probable cause exists when "an officer . . . believe [s] that
the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Desipain,
2007 UT App 367, f 9 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The facts surrounding a probable cause determination
are examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. See
id.
f21 Exigent circumstances may exist when there is "an urgency to
acquire evidence that falls outside the ordinary course of law
enforcement," Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, % 16, such as situations
where obtaining a warrant would place officers or the public at
an unacceptable risk or where the destruction of essential
evidence is imminent, see id. And where what is sought to be
searched is a person's body, "sufficient probable cause exists
only [when there is] 'a clear indication that evidence will be
found as a result of the search.'" State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61,
f 22, 147 P.3d 425 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770 (1966) ) .
f22 On the record before us, we cannot say that the totality of
the circumstances established probable cause to search Tripp's
body for incriminating evidence, i.e., to effect the blood draw.
Officer Saunders testified that he did not have a reasonable
suspicion or belief that Tripp was intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Detective Roberts testified that
he was only asked by Officer Saunders to help obtain consent and
that he was not given any information that rose to the level of
probable cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while
he observed that Tripp had red eyes, possibly from crying, and
that she was nervous and shaking, he did not observe slurred
speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any field sobriety
tests. Officer Monson testified that he did not smell alcohol or
observe any signs of impairment. Significantly, in its findings
of fact, the trial court found that " [n] o officer detected the
odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any
obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred
speech." Thus, the State has not met its burden of demonstrating
that there was probable cause to believe that Tripp had committed
an alcohol-related offense at the time her blood was drawn
without her consent,9 and we thus have no occasion to determine

9. Whether or not sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for a blood draw could have been garnered is an entirely
different matter. Given the investigating officers' singleminded focus on getting Tripp to consent to have her blood drawn,
amassing facts to establish probable cause was simply not their
objective. Had it been, they could have employed field sobriety
tests and perhaps a Breathalyzer or Intoxilyzer test to develop
probable cause for taking a sample of Tripp's blood.
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whether sufficient exigent circumstances existed to excuse
obtaining a warrant. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, % 21.
III.

Inevitable Discovery

^J23 Additionally, the State contends that Tripp's blood alcohol
content would inevitably have been discovered and that we should
therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. The crux
of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that since "'tainted
evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably
would have been discovered.'" State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,
1 14, 76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted). However, "there must be
some 'independent basis for discovery,' and 'the investigation
that inevitably would have led to the evidence [must] be
independent of the constitutional violation.'" Id. f 16
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
f24 The State's argument that it would inevitably have
discovered the blood alcohol evidence is conjectural at best.
The record does not indicate that a warrant would actually have
been issued in this case or that the desired blood test results
would actually have been obtained thereby.10 "For courts
confidently to predict what would have occurred, . . . there must
be persuasive evidence of events or circumstances apart from
those resulting in illegal police activity that would have
inevitably led to discovery." Id.
^[25 There is no such persuasive evidence here. Indeed, the only
evidence relevant to securing a warrant was that Officer Saunders
did not believe a warrant was required in serious accidents, that
Detective Roberts threatened to obtain a warrant and force a
blood draw, and that Detective Roberts thought obtaining a
warrant would take a few hours. In any event, we have already
held that the record before us does not establish a basis for
concluding that there was probable cause to justify a forcible
blood draw. We therefore cannot say that Detective Roberts would
have necessarily been able to obtain a warrant based on the
available evidence, and thus we decline to affirm on the basis of
the inevitable discovery doctrine.

10. Detective Roberts told Brian Davis it would be several hours
before a warrant could be obtained, during which time the alcohol
in Tripp's system would be dissipating.
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CONCLUSION
f26 We reverse the trial court's denial of Tripp's motion to
suppress the blood test results because the State did not meet
its burden of proving that her consent was voluntary. We also
decline to affirm on the exigent circumstances rationale offered
by the State because the State did not demonstrate that there was
probable cause for a forcible blood draw. Nor does the
inevitable discovery doctrine provide a proper basis on which to
affirm. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the motion to
suppress and remand for a new trial or such other proceedings as
may now be appropriate.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCUSIONS OF LAW

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

OStl 0 3300
Case No. 0 4 H ^ £ 5 i

-vs-

Judge John Paul Kennedy

SUSAN TRIPP,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Jolinson. The Court having
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in
the death of Daniel Pracht.
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers
could test her blood if they did not use a needle.

3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear
of needles.
4. When speaking with Ofiicer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or
drugs and expressed her fear of needles.
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired
by something.
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily.
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car.
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle
and secluded from her family and friends because they wrere interfering with
the investigation.
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the
door open and her legs outside the vehicle.
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled.

2

12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was
not in uniform.
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant.
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with lie defendant her right to remain silent, her right to
counsel, and her right to refuse the test.
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the
defendant voluntarily extended her arm.
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tied to withdraw her
ami and she never said "no" or "stop."
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant wras immediately calm and
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and
the evidence demonst'ates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant's
fear wras resolved.
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw.
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible.

DATED this 3JL day of J ^ 2 0 0 5 .
BY THE COURT:
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